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MIRANDA AND SOME PUZZLES OF
"PROPHYLACTIC" RULES*
Evan H. Caminker"
Constitutional law scholars have long observed that many doctrinal
rules established by courts to protect constitutional rights seem to
"overprotect" those rights, in the sense that they give greater protection
to individuals than those rights, as abstractly understood, seem to
require.' Such doctrinal rules are typically called "prophylactic" rules.2
Perhaps the most famous, or infamous, example of such a rule is Miranda
v. Arizona,' in which the Supreme Court implemented the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination4 with a detailed set of
directions for law enforcement officers conducting
custodial
5
interrogations, colloquially called the Mirandawarnings.
Miranda kicked off an energetic debate over the legitimacy of the
Court's creation of so-called prophylactic rules, as well as the scope of
Congress's power to alter or displace these rules. The Court breathed
new life into this debate once again last term when, in Dickerson v. United
States,6 it refused to let Congress dispense with the Miranda warnings in

* This essay is the written version of the University of Cincinnati Law Review Sponsored Lecture,
delivered at the University of Cincinnati College of Law on April 19, 2001.
** Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Michigan Law School.
I wish to thank Eve Brensike for many helpful conversations and wonderful insights about the ideas
contained herein.
I. E.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Foreoord: ConstitutionalCamonLaw,89HARV.L.REV. 1(1975); David
A. Strauss, Te Ubiquiy ofProphylactic Ru/e, 55 U. CHI. L, REV. 190 (1988).
2. Scholars have defined "prophylactic rules" in slightly different ways. See, e.g.,Susan R. Klein,
Idesji and (Re)FonnulatuigProphylacicRules, Safe Harbors,and IncidentalRighsin ConstitutionalCrinminal Procedure,
99 MIcH. L. REV. 1030, 1032 (2001) ("A 'constitutional prophylactic rule' is ajudicially-created doctrinal
rule or legal requirement determined by the Court as appropriate for deciding whether an explicit or 'true'
federal constitutional rule is applicable."); Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding ConstitutionalRights: 7he Uses and
Limits of ProphylacticRules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 926 (1999) (using term "to refer to those risk-avoidance
rules that are not directly sanctioned or required by the Constitution, but that are adopted to ensure that the
government follows constitutionally sanctioned or required rules"). To the extent the phrase "prophylactic
rule" has a useful denotation, but see infia text accompanying notes 80-93 (arguing phrase is generally more
misleading than helpful), I prefer defining the term to refer to doctrinal rules self-consciously crafted by
courts for the instrumental purpose of improving the detection of and/or otherwise safeguarding against the
violation of constitutional norms.
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. "[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ......
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. See 384 U.S. at 479. A suspect "must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires." Id.
6. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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federal interrogations, even while once again refusing to say forthrightly
that those warnings are constitutionally required.
In this essay, I employ Miranda and Dickerson together as a lens
through which to propose a particular way of defending the legitimacy
of prophylactic doctrinal rules in constitutional law and to begin
exploring some fundamental questions concerning the judicial
implementation of rights. In a nutshell, I argue that, because courts
frequently cannot determine with much certainty whether or not a
constitutional violation has occurred in a given case, and yet courts are
charged with trying to protect against constitutional violations, it is
sometimes entirely appropriate for the Supreme Court to develop
prophylactic rules safeguarding constitutional rights. In other words,
such rules respond to the inevitability of imperfect judicial detection of
constitutional wrongdoing. But I also argue that the adjective
"prophylactic" in this context is both unhelpful and unfortunate; there
is no difference in kind, or meaningful difference in degree, between
Miranda's so-called prophylactic rule and the run-of-the-mill judicial
doctrines routinely constructed by the Court that we unquestioningly
accept as perfectly legitimate exercises ofjudicial power.
I. M

.RoAAND DIcKERSOm

Let's begin with a brief reprise of Miranda and Dickerson. Prior to
Miranda, the Supreme Court had long held that a criminal suspect's
incriminating statements could not be admitted against her at trial if
those statements were rendered involuntary by police coercion.' The
Court enforced this prohibition by examining, on a case-by-case basis,
whether in the totality of circumstances a particular defendant's

7. In Brain . UnitedSafs, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination barred the introduction in federal prosecutions of involuntary confessions made
in response to custodial interrogation. See also, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964)
(affirming this interpretation of the Self-Incrimination Clause). The Court did not hold this clause applicable
to the states until 1964 in Malty v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I(1964), however, and prior to Mal//y the Court analyzed
the admissibility of confessions in state criminal prosecutions under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, beginning with Brown v. Missusippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). But the due process and selfincrimination analyses have been treated as essentially the same; the question is whether custodial
interrogation produced a "coerced" rather than "voluntary" confession. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104,
110 (1985) ("Indeed, even after holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination applies in the context of custodial interrogations, and is binding on the States, the Court has
continued to measure confessions against the requirements of due process.") (citations omitted). But see
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsideuing Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 440-46 (1987) (arguing that
compulsion for self-incrimination purposes and involuntariness for due process purposes are not entirely
identical concepts).
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confession was secured because her "will was overborne" by the police.8
I will hereafter refer to this pre-Miranda inquiry as the "case-specificvoluntariness-test."
In Miranda,the Court changed course and held that this doctrinal test
was insufficiently stringent. The Court discussed the ways in which
custodial interrogation as then practiced by law enforcement officers
across the land imposed subtle yet significant psychological pressures on
suspects to confess, and it concluded that statements elicited by such
custodial interrogation were presumptively coerced.' The Court then
announced a new doctrinal rule: statements obtained through custodial
interrogations cannot be admitted into evidence against a defendant
unless she is first read and then waives the rights to silence and counsel
mentioned in the so-called Miranda warnings. " The Court expressly
invited Congress and state governments, however, to create alternative
safeguards that would be "fully as effective" at protecting the Fifth
Amendment prohibition - in other words, equally effective at dispelling
the otherwise inherently coercive environment such interrogation
creates. I
Only two years after Miranda was decided, Congress purported to
respond to this invitation by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which "in
essence laid down a rule that the admissibility of [statements obtained
by custodial interrogation for use in federal criminal prosecutions]
should turn only on whether or not they were voluntarily made."' 2 For

8. E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (noting that the question is whether
"the confession [is] the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker" or whether the
defendant's "will has been overborne") (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)).
9. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-458.
10. Jd.at467-76.
1I. Id. at 490; see also Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 440 (referencing Miranda'sinvitation).
12. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. For an argument that § 3501 is more fairly described as an attack on
Miranda (and the Warren Court's criminal procedure precedents more generally) than a good-faith response
to the Miranda Court's invitation of legislative alternatives, see Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overriue"
Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 883, 887-906 (2000).
The relevant portions of § 3501 are as follows:
§ 3501. Admissibility of confessions
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of
Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, -shall be admissible in evidence
if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall,
out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge
determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the
trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and
shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under
all the circumstances.
(b) The trialjudge in determining the issue ofvoluntariness shall take into consideration
all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1)
the time elapsing
between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if itwas made after
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various reasons, the question of whether Congress could in essence
"overrule" Miranda'swarning requirements did not reach the Supreme
Court for thirty-two years. But the issue was finally posed last year in
Dlckerson.
Many constitutional pundits thought this case was too close to call.
The reason is that in the three decades since Mirandawas decided, the
Supreme Court had articulated a number of so-called exceptions to
Miranda'sexclusionary rule. More forebodingly, the Court had justified
its decision to do so on the ground that the Miranda rule was merely
"prophylactic" rather than an interpretation of the Fifth Amendment
itself, and thus statements obtained absent compliance with the Miranda
rule were not really obtained in violation of the Constitution. For
example, the Court held that unwarned statements could be used to
impeach a defendant's testimony 3 and to develop leads to other tangible
evidence of guilt (such that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" suppression
doctrine doesn't apply).'" In each case, the Court kept reminding us
that Miranda violations were not full-fledged constitutional violations.
To be more specific: if an incriminating statement was obtained under
circumstances that rendered it "involuntary" as measured under the
Court's prior case-specific-voluntariness-test, then the statement could
not be used for any purpose in a criminal proceeding; such so-called
"involuntary" confessions were considered to reflect "real"
constitutional violations and thus were subject to blanket exclusion.' 5
But statements that were considered "freely given" as measured by the
case-specific-voluntariness-test yet obtained in violation of Mirandawere
understood as violating only a prophylactic rule, and as such could be
used for various purposes other than evidence in the prosecution's case-

arrest and before arraignment, (2)whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense
with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the
confession, (3)whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required
to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether
or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of
counsel; and (5)whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when
questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into
consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of the voluntariness of the
confession.
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000).
13. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222(1971).
14. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). Seealso, e.g., Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975)
(holding that the Hamis impeachment exception applies to post-invocation as well as unwarncd statements);
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (announcing a "public safety" exception warranting unwamed
questioning); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (holding that the Miranda waiver's is not necessarily
tainted by prior admission in response to unwamed questioning).
15. Se e.g.,Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 (1984).
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in-chief. In Michigan v. Tucker, 6 for example, then-Justice Rehnquist
observed that the "police conduct at issue here did not abridge [the]
constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, but
departed only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this
Court in Miranda."'7
But in Dickerson, it was ChiefJustice Rehnquist himself who authored
the 7-2 opinion affirming Miranda and, this time characterizing it as a
"constitutionally based rule" rather than a non-constitutional,
prophylactic one, held that Miranda precluded Congress from
authorizing the use of unwarned but voluntary statements in the
prosecution's case-in-chief.'8 Perhaps the ChiefJustice's belated support
for a constitutionalized version of Miranda; notwithstanding his previous
ardent opposition thereto, wasn't as big a surprise as it might appear at
first glance. Certainly experience has indicated that the warning
requirements, at least when coupled with the numerous judicial
exceptions thereto, haven't placed a significant burden on law
enforcement officers and, indeed, arguably have made theirjobs easier
by making clear how they can virtually guarantee that custodial
interrogations will lead to admissible evidence.' 9 But other than noting
this precise fact,2" the ChiefJustice certainly made little effort to square
the decision with the Court's (and his) repeated disparagement of
Miranda as articulating merely a prophylactic rule not required by the
Fifth Amendment, or to explain clearly why Congress cannot authorize
federal officers to engage in conduct that, according to much postMirandaprecedent, does not violate the Constitution itself.
This lack of intellectual coherence, or at least candor, did not go
unnoticed. In his blistering dissent, Justice Scalia (joined by Justice
Thomas) complained that the Court did not and could not, without
overruling a host of cases, say with a straight face that the introduction
of a voluntary but non-Miranda-compliant confession violates the

16. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
17. Id. at 446; see id at 439 (explaining that the question whether the "police conduct complained
of directly infringed upon respondent's right against compulsory self-incrimination" was a "separate
question" from "whether it instead violated only the prophylactic rules developed to protect that right"). See
also, e.g., Qals,467 U.S. at 654 ("[t]he prophylactic Miranda warnings . . . are 'not themselves rights
protected by the Constitution ... "') (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444); Elitad, 470 U.S. at 307 ("Miranda's
preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the defiendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional
harm").
18. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438 ("Mranda is a constitutional decision"); id.at 440 ("Miranda is
constitutionally based"); id. at 444 ("Miranda announced a constitutional rule").
19. Seo,e.g., Richard A. Lco, (u2stionng
theRelevance of Miranda inAsTwenty-First Centuy, 99 MICH.
L. REV. 1000 (200 1); Welsh S.White, Miranda's FailuretoResrain Pemiour Intkrogation ractices, 99 MICH.
L.REv. 1211(2001).
20. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443-44.
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Constitution, and yet the Court Provided no other basis for its power to
ignore the directives of§ 3501.2 The closest the ChiefJustice came to
justifying his new-found conclusion thatMirandamust be constitutionally
based was that otherwise the Court couldn't have made it applicable to
the states,22 a claim the dissent correctly called question-begging.23 And
the closest the ChiefJustice came to reconciling Dickerson with Miranda's
undercutting progeny was to observe that "no constitutional rule is
immutable," 24 a claim the dissent correctly called "supremely
unhelpful." 2
.In fairness to the ChiefJustice, perhaps there was no way to respond
to the dissent's charges while still purporting to speak for six other
Justices, who had earlier expressed widely disparate views of Miranda's
meaning and doctrinal foundation.26 In any event, my aim in this essay
is to be constructive rather than critical. I wish to advance a defense for
the Court's treatment of Mirandaand invalidation of§ 3501 in Dickerson
that sheds some light on the justification for and nature of prophylactic
rules in general.
II. JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
THE PROBLEM OF IMPERFECT DETECTABILITY

Judicial implementation of constitutional rights requires two major
steps. First, the Supreme Court must interpret the Constitution to
identify the constitutional norm relevant to resolving a given dispute.
Perhaps there are some constitutional dictates whose meaning is
basically determinate; the Constitution's requirement that one must be

21. Id. at 450-57 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In one of my favorite Scalia-isms of recent times, surely
destined to become a classic, Justice Scalia accused the Court of violating the requirement that it "make
sense" of its case law. This requirement "is the only thing," charged Scalia, "that prevents this Court from
being some sort of nine-headed Caesar, giving thumbs-up or thumbs-down to whatever outcome, case by
case, suits or offends its collective fancy." Id at 455. While I agree whole-heartedly with this sentiment, I
can't resist noting that Scaliawas apparently taken in by decades of misinformed Hollywood movie directors.
In Caesar's Rome, the best historical evidence suggests, the relevant signals for life (something positive) and
death (something negative) were not thumbs-up and thumbs-down. Rather, a thumbs-up signified death to
a fallen gladiator, and a closed fist signified that the gladiator had fought sufficiently valiantly to justify
retaining his life. See Anthony Corbeill, Thumbs in Ancient Ronm Pollex as Index, 42 MEMOIRs AM. ACAD.
ROME 1(1997).
22. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438-39.
23. Id. at 456-57 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
24. ld. at 441.
25. Id. at 455 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
26. Sea Yale Kamisar, Miranda 7V-Fwte rears Later: A Close Look at the Majorit and Dissenting Opinions
in Dickerson, 33 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 387, 398 (2001) ("I~t is hard to see how the ChiefJustice could have held
all sixjustices if he had written at any length about the constitutional status of prophylactic rules in general
or the Mirandarules in particular.").
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thirty-five years old to be President comes readily to mind." For the
most part, however, the Court must translate a somewhat abstract
constitutional norm into a more specific conception of a constitutional
right or duty.28 The Fifth Amendment prohibition against being
"compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself' requires
some such translation because the key term "compelled" is subject to
various plausible interpretations. For example, this prohibition could
encompass the following confessions: those coerced by force of law,
those coerced by police pressure, those coerced by private actors,
and/or those that the defendant perceives to be compelled by the voice
of God (or perhaps the little devil she imagines sitting on her other
shoulder). As we know, the Court long ago concluded that a defendant's
statement is "compelled" when it is rendered "involuntary" in response
to some state-sponsored legal or informal coercion including custodial
interrogation rather than merely by private pressure or internal
psychological compulsion.29 The point is that the Court must first
decide which conception of a given right is most faithful to the
constitutional text and its animating principles, typically as among
several or more plausible conceptions.
The second step is for the Supreme Court to translate further that
conception of a constitutional right or duty into a more specific and
workable set of doctrinal rules that can feasibly be applied to safeguard
that right or enforce that duty in specific cases. In the familiar context
of protecting the freedom of speech, for example, the Court has
developed a complex set of doctrines governing defamation law, where
the level of constitutional protection afforded speech turns on whether
the allegedly defamed person is a public or private figure;"0 a complex

27. U.S. CONST. art. 11,
§ I, cl.
5.
28. &e Richard H. Fallon,Jr., F i'"d. Imp/tian
the Coastituio, Il iHARV. L. REV. 56 (1997).
Considerjust two examples. The "establishment of religion" pmhibited by the First Amendment could refer
to governmental coercion to perform religious practices, or governmental indoctrination of religious beliefs,
or governmental endorsement of religious tenets, or all of the above. The Sixth Amendment's right to
"assistance of counsel" could guarantee an accused a minimally effective defense, even one publicly
subsidized if necessary, or could guarantee no more than that the government not purposefully interfere with
the performance of an accused person's counsel should the accused choose and be able to obtain private
representation.
29. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-67 (1986) (holding that coercive law enforcement
activity is a prerequisite to finding a confession involuntary, and rejecting defendant's claim that his
confession was coerced by the "voice of God").
30. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment
precludes state tort liability for defamatory statements about "public figures" absent knowledge or reckless
disregard for falsity); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (noting no similar First Amendment
protection for defamatory statements about "private figures," unless more than compensatory damages
sought); see
genera//y Steven Shiffrin, DefaatoyNon-Media Speech and FirstAmandntentMethodlogv, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 915 (1978).
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set of doctrines governing speech in allegedly public spaces, where the
level of constitutional protection afforded speech turns on whether the
space is denominated a public, limited-public, or nonpublic forum;3
and a complex set of doctrines governing general restraints on speech,
where the constitutionality of such a restraint turns on whether the
restraint is either content- or viewpoint-discriminatory. 2 Such doctrinal
constructs are all around us fleshing out virtually every principle of
constitutional law. The judicial objective is to construct a workable
doctrinal framework with which to detect and screen out governmental
33
conduct that transgresses a constitutional right in a particular case.
At first glance, it would seem logical for the Court simply to ask, in
each case, whether the government conduct at issue violates its specific
conception of a right. In the Fifth Amendment context, 6tor example,
the Court would consider whether, given the totality of the
circumstances, a particular confession has been obtained through
government compulsion. Indeed, Justice Scalia seems in his Dickerson
dissent to view the case-specific-voluntariness-test as itselfbeing dictated
by the Constitution, such that a confession is in actualfact compelled if
and only if the voluntariness test identifies it as being such."
But this seemingly straightforward approach ignores the messy
problem of uncertainty about the occurrence of a constitutional
violation. To be sure, sometimes the Court can construct and
implement a doctrine that will allow it to identify each occasion of a
constitutional violation with a high degree of certainty. It might be easy
enough to determine whether a President-elect is thirty-five years old.
But in many contexts there is no doctrinal test that can perfecty detect
each instance in which the government has transgressed a particular
constitutional norm. For example, the First Amendment protects
against purposeful suppression of speech because of disagreement with
its content, and the Fourteenth Amendment protects against purposeful
racial discrimination, but it is difficult to know with certainty whether a
particular statute reflects such invidious purposes.

31. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-50 (1983) (outlining
the different doctrinal tests associated with each of these three categories of fora); seegeneraly Lillian R.
BeVier, RehailiiW Puhhc Fonm Doct&. In Defense of Categores, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 79.
32. See, e.g.,Police Dep't. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating ordinance banning all picketing
except labor picketing near schools during school hours); see generay Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public
Furpase. The Rol of Govnmental Motive in FrstAmendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996).
33. See Fallon, supra note 28, at 67-106 (discussing and illustrating eight different types ofljudicially
constructed doctrinal tests).
34. See Dikerson, 530 U.S. at 464 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("voluntariness remains the constitutional
standard").
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In such contexts, a seemingly straightforward, case-by-case inquiry
into whether a constitutional norm has been transgressed will result in
what might be called "adjudication errors," meaning the production of
false-negatives and false-positives. A judicial test generates a falsenegative when it labels government conduct as permissible even though,
were we omniscient, we would know that the conduct was actually
unconstitutional. Conversely, a judicial test produces a false-positive
when it labels government conduct as impermissible even though, were
we omniscient, we would know that the conduct was actually
constitutional. The larger point here is that there is frequently a
disconnect between a doctrinal rule and what it purports to measure in
the real world.
Much of the time, even when it becomes aware of this imperfection
injudicial detectability, the Supreme Court apparently believes that the
fit between the results of a doctrinal test and what it purports to measure
is, shall we say, close enough for government work. But sometimes, the
Court will conclude that the likelihood offalse-negatives is unacceptably
high; in other words, the direct doctrinal inquiry actually proves to be
insufficiently protective of the constitutional values at stake given the
persistence of unconstitutional conduct. I believe this is the best, and a
fully sufficient, explanation for and justification of Miranda's so-called
prophylactic rule governing custodial interrogations. Justice Scalia's
apparent assumption that a directjudicial inquiry into voluntariness can
accurately divide the universe of confessions into truly compelled ones
and truly freely-given ones, such that a confession that satisfies the
Court's test is infactvoluntary and therefore constitutionally permissible,
is unrealistically optimistic.
In developing the case-specific-voluntariness-test over time, the Court
came to recognize that the voluntariness of a given confession could turn
on a broad range of variables, including the suspect's knowledge (for
example, was she aware of her rights to silence and counsel?); her
general faculties (was she mature and in good mental health?); her
specific mental and physical condition (was she hungry, fatigued, drunk,
medicated, stressed out, or even scared out of her wits?); and the nature
of the interrogation (how long did it last, was counsel present, did she
have access to family and friends, was she physically restrained, and
what precise police tactics were used?). 35 Given the nature of the
doctrinal test, it seems to me that there are a number of reasons to worry

35. See,e.g.,Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693-94 (1993) (lising numerous factors and citing
cases invoking them); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (same).
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that the application of such a test might generate a high adjudication
error rate.
First, it is quite difficult to imagine that a trial court could, through
the normal factfinding process, determine the historical set of events
surrounding a custodial interrogation with 100% accuracy. This is
particularly so when the relevant factfinding frequently pits the word of
the police interrogators against the word of the suspect, 36 and one can
easily imagine that judges would routinely, if only subconsciously, tend
to favor the police in their credibility assessments.37 And any such prolaw-enforcement proclivity in credibility assessments might create a
feedback loop: once officers learn that judges tend to credit their
testimony, they might develop greater confidence that they can shade
the truth in their testimony and get away with it. Finally, this factfinding
is most commonly done by state judges, and particularly several decades
ago the Supreme Court might well have worried that such judges, again
perhaps only subconsciously, might in general be somewhat
underprotective
of a state criminal suspect's federal constitutional
38
rights.
Moreover, there's a second difficulty. Even if a trial court could
perfectly reconstruct the historical events, it still remains, difficult,
perhaps conceptually impossible, for the court to construct a metric by
which to determine whether a particular defendant's will was actually
"overborne" by those events. As the Supreme Court has itself noted, "a
complex of values underlies the stricture against use by the state of
confessions which, by way of convenient shorthand, this Court terms
involuntary, and the role played by each in any situation varies
according to the particular circumstances of the case. '3 9 As a result,
"[t]he line between proper and permissible police conduct and
techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at best, a difficult
one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is necessary to
make fine judgments as to the effect of psychologically coercive

36. SeeMiller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 117 (1985) (noting that subsidiary factual questions "often
require the resolution of conflicting testimony of police and defendant").
37. See Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adaptingto Miranda. Modem Interrogators'Strategiesfor Dealing
with the Obstaces Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 424 n.133 (1999) ("When suspects and police
officers differ as to critical facts, moreover, judges are likely to resolve the credibility dispute in favor of the
officers."); Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supren Court and the Rig/U ofSuspects in Crninal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 785, 808-09 (1970) (same).
38. See generally Burt Ncubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). The Court has
held that, in reviewing state court determinations of voluntariness, a federal court should "make an

independent evaluation ofthe record." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978); see
also Miller, 474 U.S.
at 110-12 (same independence of habeas review).

39. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960).
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pressures and inducements on the mind and will of an accused."' For
example, suppose a particular suspect was mentally disturbed, was only
vaguely aware he could ask for a lawyer but did not know one, was
ravenously hungry and fatigued, and was subject to a three-hour
interrogation under .bright lights? Suppose instead the suspect was
mentally stable, and knew he was entided to a lawyer but was told he
could not have one, was only slightly hungry but told he could not eat
again until he had confessed, and was subject to a ten-hour interrogation
while being shackled to a chair? How do each of these and other
relevant variables interact for each suspect? How can we "know"
which, if either, of the two suspects ends up confessing involuntarily? In
the end, even if a judge knows perfectly all of the facts, he must still
engage in some norm-laden speculation to decide whether the particular
defendant's will was overborne by police tactics. Put simply:
uncertainty is endemic to Fifth Amendment law.
For all of these reasons, the Supreme Court could reasonably
conclude that the case-specific-voluntariness-test typically would not
accurately reconstruct the historical truth behind a particular custodial
interrogation, and it could not then objectively measure and balance the
many relevant variables bearing on voluntariness so as to reach a result
that infallibly reflects the underlying reality whether a confession was
actually compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. And
indeed, this argument tracks what the Supreme Court said about
Mirandain Dickerson:

In Miranda, the Court noted that reliance on the traditional
totality-of-the-circumstances test raised a risk of overlooking an
involuntary custodial confession, a risk that the Court found
unacceptably great when the confession is offered in the case in chief
to prove guilt. The Court therefore concluded that something more
than the totality test was necessary. 4

In other words, the case-specific-voluntariness-test produced more falsenegatives than the Court could tolerate; some more stringent doctrinal
protection was therefore appropriate.
To be sure, much of the story thus far is not entirely novel. Other
constitutional scholars have observed that the Court sometimes eschews
a direct, case-by-case inquiry into whether a constitutional norm has
been transgressed in favor of some alternative doctrinal rule that proves
more judicially manageable; and sometimes the Court is driven to do
so by the worry that a direct doctrinal inquiry will end up

40. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963).
41. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442(2000).
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underprotecting the constitutional norm in question. Thus others before
me have argued that courts must take into account their own
institutional limitations and the resulting inherent uncertainties in
constitutional adjudication when crafting doctrines to enforce
constitutional norms.42
But for the most part, scholars have failed to consider in any detail
either of two critical questions about the formulation of prophylactic
rules: (1) how close to 10 0 % detection of unconstitutional conduct may
or must the Court aspire in devising a prophylactic rule, and (2) what
types ofprophylactic rules are appropriate in particular contexts? These
are important questions because one might concede the need for some
supplemental protection for the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, and yet argue that the Mirandawarnings go way too far
or go off in the wrong direction. These questions deserve far more
attention than I can give them in this brief essay, but let me offer some
tentative proposals.
A. Mirandaand the Force ofFalse-Negatives
How much ofan effort should the Supreme Court make to reduce the
false-negatives that would otherwise be generated by the case-specificvoluntariness-test? What is the appropriate level of additional
protection?
One could propose that the Court eradicate all false-negatives,
meaning it should strive to erect a perfect screen. Indeed, the Court
apparently believes that Miranda comes pretty close to this level; in
Dickerson, the Court noted that it would be quite "rare" for a Miranda-

42. For such an argument defending Miranda, see David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and
Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958, 962-64 ( 2001) (explaining that Miranda reflects a cost-benefit judgment
concerning how best to implement the self-incrimination privilege, with the error-rate of case-specificvoluntary-test being one factor in the calculus); seegenera//y, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Miranda Deconstitutionalized:
4hen the Se/f-Incnrmination Clause and the Civil Rights Act Collide, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 482-83 (1994)
(suggesting Court has obligation to create remedies or procedures necessary to safeguard a constitutional
provision otherwise at risk); Landsberg, supra note 2, at 950 (saying that prophylactic rules "are predicated
on ajudicial judgment that the risk of a constitutional violation issufficiently great that simple case-by-case
enforcement of the core right isinsufficient to secure that right").
Professor David Strauss has developed this line of argument in the First Amendment context as
well, arguing that thejudicial doctrine requiring invalidation of content-based speech restrictions serves as
a proxy for the "real" constitutional concern, which is whether a given statute is purposefully designed to
suppress private speech. Whereas a direct inquiry into official motive would likely lead to a high rate of
adjudicatory error and thus underprotect First Amendment values, application of the doctrinal requirement
of content-neutrality will do a better job of screening out statutes that are motivated by impermissible
purposes and are therefore actually unconstitutional. Strauss, supra, at 963-66; Strauss, supra note 1,at 198204.
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compliant interrogation to produce a coerced confession."3 In theory,
the Court could go even further and completey eliminate all falsenegatives by precluding the government from using any incriminating
statements produced by custodial interrogation. But this approach
would essentially terminate a very important law enforcement
technique, arguably going way too far in the effort to eradicate the last
marginal possibility of a coerced confession.
I propose instead that the Supreme Court should employ a balancing
test similar to the Mathews v. Eldridge" test applied in the procedural due
process context. In basic terms, the Mathews test dictates that before the
government acts to deprive an individual of some benefit such as a job
or welfare payments, the government must provide the individual with
some procedural safeguards against a substantively wrongful
deprivation, such as notice and a hearing. The Court sets the
appropriate level of procedural safeguards by balancing (a) the strength
of the individual's interest in avoiding wrongful deprivation of the
particular benefit at issue; (b)the value of additional specific safeguards
in reducing false-negatives, i.e., deprivations that really should not occur
under the substantive law; and (c) the cost to legitimate government
interests in providing such additional safeguards.45
One can model the matter of prophylactic rules in an analogous
manner: the Fifth Amendment grants me an entitlement not to have a
coerced confession introduced against me in a criminal case; if the
government introduces my confession against me in a criminal
prosecution, there is some risk that it is depriving me of my Fifth
Amendment entitlement because there is some risk that my confession
was actually coerced; therefore, the government must provide me with
procedural safeguards to minimize sufficiently the possibility that I will
be wrongly deprived of my Fifth Amendment entitlement. The
question whether the government must do more than judicially apply
the case-specific-voluntariness-test turns on whether a set of proposed
additional safeguards (such as the Mirandawarnings) would significantly
reduce the level of false-negatives without unduly disrupting legitimate
government interests, for example, by producing too many falsepositives by excluding too many confessions that were actually freely
given.
I believe that the Mirandaframework meets this standard, and I think
that Chief'Justice Rehnquist thinks so as well - which I suspect is why
in Dickerson, when push came to shove, he was willing to live with it.
43. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984)).
44. 424 U.S. 319(1976).
45. Seeid at 334-35.
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Part of Miranda's brilliance is that it turns out not to obstruct law
enforcement investigations as much as many had feared. Of course,
sometimes freely-given statements elicited by non-Miranda-complaint
interrogations are suppressed, but this loss is preventable easily enough;
officers must simply follow Miranda's strictures. The only unavoidable
loss comes when officers issue the Mirandawarnings and a suspect, who
was about to confess freely, now decides to keep mum. But while
empirical data and interpretations thereof are not entirely uniform, it
appears that the Miranda framework has not significantly affected
confession rates.' Thus, I believe, Mirandastrikes a reasonable balance
under the Mathews v. Eldridge rubric - one that certainly protects against
false-negatives, but also allows interrogations to continue and, indeed,
arguably assists that practice by providing clear lines for police to walk.47
B. Alternative Means to Protect Fifih Amendment Rights
The second but related basic question is this: once the Supreme
Court perceives a need to reduce false-negatives, how should the Court
go about it? Many have complained that the Mirandadoctrine, with its

46. Compare, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-rearPerspective on
Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998) (arguing that Mirandahas led to
a reduction in "crime clearance rates"), and Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of
Miranda's Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1084 (1996) (responding to opposite claim), Wilt, e.g., John J.
Donohue I1,Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectweness?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (1998) (questioning Cassell
& Fowles' methodology and results); StephenJ. Schulhofer, Miranda's PracticalEffect: SubstantialBenefits and
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 503 (1996) (stating empirical analysis leading to the
conclusion that "Miranda's detectable net impact on conviction rates shrinks virtually to zero"); and Richard
A. Leo, The Impact ofMiranda Revisited, 86J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621 (1996) (saying that while Miranda
may result in marginally lower conviction rates, in general police have successfully adapted to Mirandain
ways that facilitate effective law enforcement). It isnoteworthy that the United States argued in Dickerson that
Miranda poses no significant threat to federal law enforcement capabilities. Brief for the United States at 34,
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525) ("In short, federal law enforcement agencies
have concluded that the Mirandadecision itselfgenerally does not hinder their investigations and the issuance
of Mirandawarnings at the outset of a custodial interrogation is in the best interests of law enforcement as
well as the suspect.").
47. Some scholars have suggested that this type of cost-benefit analysis is properly left for the
legislative arena and lies outside the boundaries of judicial competence and legitimacy. See generaly, e.g.,
Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117

(1978); Joseph D. Grano, ProphylacticRules in Criminal Procedure: A Question ofArtile 111 egitimay, 80 NW. U.
L. REV. 100 (1985). It seems to me that the Supreme Court iscertainly well situated to assess the frequency
and types of false-negatives created under various doctrinal procedures. Of course, as explained above,
neither the Court nor any legislative body can determine with 100% accuracy how many false-negatives are
produced by the Miranda doctrine, by the case-specific-voluntariness-test, or by any other doctrinal screen.
The very uncertainty with which I am concerned undermines any strong claim to "know" what the falsenegative (or false-positive) rate iswith any specific test. My point is more modest and comparative; the
Court isnot so ill-equipped or otherwise institutionally incompetent so as to make this type of determination
the unique province of legislative rather than judicial actors.
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almost code-like requirements for valid law enforcement interrogations,
feels overly "legislative" in character, and that the Court should instead
have tried some alternative measures that feel more traditional, more
comfortably "judicial" in nature. Why not instead, for example,
supplement the case-specific-voluntariness-test with some evidentiary
rules that will help the factfinding court reconstruct and determine the
historical truth behind an interrogation, thereby making a better
substantive determination? Or if that won't work, why not adopt some
evidentiary presumptions or tinker with burdens of persuasion to better
allocate the risk of adjudication error in a more rights-protective way?
As it so happens, the Supreme Court has embraced both of these
methods in various other contexts. Consider, for example, North Carolina
v. Pearce, 8 in which the Court articulated evidentiary rules so as to
improve the record from which a reviewing court could accurately assess
the facts. The Pearce Court observed that defendants who successfully
appeal an initial conviction or sentence sometimes receive a punishment
after subsequently being reconvicted and resentenced that is harsher
than the one originally imposed. The Court worried that, at least in
some instances, sentencing judges were punishing defendants for their
initial successful appeal, and such vindictiveness violates due process.
The Court acknowledged, however, that "the existence of a retaliatory
motivation would... be extremely difficult to prove in any individual
case."49 And yet the Court believed that "such untoward sentences
occurred with sufficient frequency to warrant the imposition of a
prophylactic rule . . . ,5' So instead of directly inquiring into the
motives of the sentencing judge, the Supreme Court announced the
following rule:
[W] henever ajudge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant
after a new trial, the reasons for... doing so must affirmatively appear
... . Those reasons must be based upon objective information
concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring
after the time of the original sentencing proceeding [e.g., commission
of a new criminal offense]. And the factual data upon which the
increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that
the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully
reviewed on appeal. 5'
By requiring sentencingjudges affirmatively to explain their motives and
cite supportive evidence for their claims, Pearce's prophylactic rule in
48.
49.
50.
51.

395 U.S. 711 (1969).
11 at.725 n.20.
Cohen v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726.
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effect constructed a record enabling reviewing courts to make a more
accurate assessment of the underlying historical facts in a realm of
inherent uncertainty, thereby reducing the number of actual due process
violations that would otherwise slip through the reviewing court's radar
screen. In addition, arguably the requirement that sentencing judges
document their thinking likely reduces the actual occurrence of
sentences motivated by vindictiveness by making those judges focus on
their actual thought processes. 2
Could the Supreme Court have done something similar in the Fifth
Amendment context? I believe that, in contrast to the situation in Pearce,
it might prove quite difficult for the Court to encourage the creation and
preservation of a factual record regarding custodial interrogations - at
least without embracing a doctrinal rule that Miranda'scritics would find
equally or more troubling. The primary difficulty today is that typically
the only persons with knowledge of the facts surrounding a particular
custodial interrogation are the participating police and the suspect,
which is why a fair and accurate reconstruction of events is quite
difficult. Perhaps the Court could have required the police to audiotape
or even videotape all custodial interrogations, a popular legislative
proposal today, but there might be some question in each case whether
the tape had been turned on at all relevant times or had been doctored
after the fact. (Ever since those great scenes in Forrest Gump with Tom
Hanks chatting with President Kennedy, I've become more and more
suspicious of so-called "live" videotaping.) Or instead, the Court might
have required that all custodial interrogations be conducted in the
presence of a neutral judicial magistrate who could be trusted fairly to
observe and record the events. But surely certain scholars would have
sharply criticized these sorts of requirements as being even more
intrusive on and improperly regulatory of police behavior than the
Mirandawarnings.
What about adjusting the burden of persuasion so as to generate
fewer false-negatives in this realm of uncertainty? The Supreme Court
tries to manage uncertainty through this means in various other
contexts. Consider, for example, Batson v. Kentucky." The Court had
previously held, in Swain v. Alabama,54 that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits prosecutors from using peremptory challenges purposefully to
weed out poiential jurors on the basis of their race. To prove such a

52. Cf Frederick Schauer, GiviqgReasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 652 (1995) ("Perhaps the very fact
of writing (or writing publicly, although the two are hardly the same) serves as a constraint. Perhaps there
are things we can think but cannot write down.").
53. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
54. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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claim under Swain, the defendant had to show a pattern of such
discriminatory challenges over a series of cases.55 Batson held that this
standard 'of proof was too rigorous and was essentially immunizing
discriminatory behavior from constitutional scrutiny - in other words,
the doctrinal test was generating too many false-negatives. The Court
responded by adjusting the defendant's evidentiary burden, holding that
the defendant could establish a prima facie case of an equal protection
violation merely by raising an inference of discrimination in his trial
alone.
In contrast, however, it isn't clear that adjusting an evidentiary
burden would be as workable or desirable in the Fifth Amendment
context. The Supreme Court confronted this precise question in Lego v.
Twomy. 56 There, a criminal defendant argued that the state could not
use his confession against him unless the state proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the confession was freely given. If adopted, this
burden of proof likely would have drastically reduced the level of falsenegatives because any uncertainty at all would be resolved in favor of
suppression. But the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's proposal,
holding that while the state bore the burden ofproving that a confession
was not coerced, the state had to show this only by a preponderance of
the evidence.57 Curiously, the Court seemed dismissive of the concern
that the lower standard of proofwould contribute to false-negatives; the
Court claimed that "no substantial evidence has accumulated that
federal rights have suffered from determining admissibility by a
preponderance of the evidence." 58 Of course, Lego was decided six years
after Miranda,so by that time the case-specific-voluntariness-test was no
longer doing much of the work in screening coerced confessions, and
therefore that specific test's rate of false-negatives no longer had much
impact on the overall, Miranda-controlled adjudication error-rate.
Perhaps the real problem was that the Court could diminish falsenegatives by radically raising the government's burden of persuasion
only at the cost of radically increasing the number of false-positives as
well, meaning the suppression of confessions that were in fact freely
given but could not be proven so by the government.59 In other words,
given the intractable difficulties in reconstructing and assessing the
55. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93 (noting that post-Swain lower court decisions required such proof).
56. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
57. See
also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1986) (relying on Lego, holding that the state
must prove waiver of Miranda rights only by preponderance of evidence).
58. Lego, 404 U.S. at 488.
59. See
id at 489 ("it isvery doubtful that escalating the prosecution's burden of proof... would be
sufficiently productive in this respect to outweigh the public interest in placing probative evidence before
juries").

HeinOnline -- 70 U. Cin. L. Rev. 17 2001-2002

18

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol.70

historical events underlying each custodial interrogation, a shift in the
burden of proof could flip the results in a vast array of cases and cure the
false-negative problem only by creating a huge false-positive problem.
Perhaps the Court should have considered some intermediate position,
such as proof of non-coercion by clear-and-convincing evidence. But
even if this generated a more favorable balance of reduced falsenegatives and increased false-positives, one could still say the following:
the totality-of-the-circumstances test would still necessarily be applied
in a subjective, ad hoc manner, providing little or no advance guidance
to police as to how they could encourage confessions without crossing
the line. And the more fuzzy the line, the more tempting it will be for
police to approach that line, and hence the more frequently they will
end up crossing it. So a comparative advantage of Miranda is that its
requirements create a positive feedback loop. Law enforcement officers
might well respond to clear guidance by modifying their behavior in
ways that reduce the instances of coercion, and thus the number of
undetected constitutional violations.6" This, I believe, is what makes
Mirandalook reasonable compared to the burden-shifting alternatives Miranda both reduces false-negatives and arguably reduces the amount
of coercion going on in the first place.
In the end, therefore, a strong case can be made that the Miranda
requirements constitute a more appropriate response to the problem of
imperfect detectability of Fifth Amendment violations than any of these
proposed adjustments in evidentiary rules or burdens. More generally,
I believe that Miranda reflects a reasonable, even if not the only
reasonable, solution to the clear deficiencies of the prior case-specificvoluntariness-test. Many have argued that Miranda went too far, but it
cannot be gainsaid that Miranda did not go as far as it could have gone,
say, by excluding the fruits of all custodial interrogation conducted
outside the presence of counsel. Miranda strikes a balance - one that
certainly militates against false-negatives, to be sure - but one that also
allows custodial interrogations to continue and, indeed, arguably
supports that practice by providing clear guidelines for police to follow.
One final observation warrants brief mention: this approach to
justifying Miranda can square it with many of the later-recognized
60. &e, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 694 (1993) ("Miranda's 'core virtue' was 'afford[ing]
police and courts clear guidance on the manner in which to conduct a custodial interrogation') (quoting
Fare v. Michael C., 439 U.S. 1310, 1314 (1978) (Rehnquist,J., in chambers)); Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) ("[t]he totality-of-the-circumstances test... is more difficult than Mirandafor law
enforcement officers to conform to"); Strauss, supra note 42, at 962 ("Mirandawill deter law enforcement
officers, to some degree, from trying to compel confessions"); Schulhofer, supranote 7, at 451 ("The case-bycase [voluntariness] approach even failed to prevent, and in subtle ways actually encouraged, outright
physical brutality.").
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"exceptions" to Miranda. Consider, for example, the impeachment-use
exception announced in Harrisv. New York. 6 The benefits and costs of
applying Miranda's presumption that non-Miranda-compliant
interrogations are "compelled" differ when incriminating statements are
used for impeachment purposes rather than in the case-in-chief. The
issue of impeachability will arise only in a smaller subset of all cases,
because many defendants will not take the stand, and many of those
who do won't perjure themselves in a manner subject to impeachment
by their earlier confession, so the benefits of expanding the doctrinal test
beyond voluntariness are not as great in this context. Since fewer
confessions will be at issue, the absolute number of improperly admitted
coerced confessions will be lower than if the Court used the
voluntariness test even for admissibility of statements in the case-inchief. And the requirement that officers provide warnings to enable
introduction of elicited statements in the prosecutor's case-in-chief
remains sufficient to influence police behavior so as to deter actual
coercion. On the other hand, the costs of an overinclusive doctrinal test
would be higher in the impeachment context - the use of non-Mirandacompliant confessions for impeachment purposes is important to ensure
that defendants do not have "a license to use perjury by way of a
defense."62 I personally am unsure whether the Court reached the
correct conclusion in Harris, even given the somewhat different costbenefit analysis, particularly given the mounting evidence that police
now intentionally elicit unwarned confessions to use for impeachment
purposes.6" But my point for present purposes is merely that it is not
conceptually incoherent, asJustice Scalia and some others charge,6 for
the Court to conclude in Mirandathat the institutional inability of state
and federal courts to avoid false-negatives with the voluntariness test
justifies a broader doctrine with respect to the prosecution's case-inchief, and yet to conclude in Harristhat the same institutional constraints
do not justify a similarly broad doctrinal rule with respect to
impeachment. One can articulate a similar defense (with somewhat
different cost-benefit criteria) of other exceptions to Miranda,such as New

61. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
62. Id. at 226.
63. See Charles D. Weisselberg, SavingMiranda, 84 CoRNELLL. REV. 109,132-140 (1998) (discussing
and documenting growing practice of intentional questioning "outside Airanda" to obtain evidence usable
for impeachment and other purposes); Charles D. Weisselberg, InatlStationHouwe Aler Dickerson, 99 MICH.

L. REV. 1121(2001) (same).
64. SeeDickerson, 530 U.S. at 455 (Scalia,J., diseting).

HeinOnline -- 70 U. Cin. L. Rev. 19 2001-2002

20

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LA W REVIEW

[Vol.70

York v. Quarles65 (establishing a "public safety" exception) and Michigan v.
TuckeW (establishing a "fruit of the poisonous tree" exception).67
Given the defense of Miranda's prophylactic rule I have sketched, it
becomes clear why I believe that the Court reached the right conclusion
in Dickerson - though I, along withJustice Scalia, would have preferred
the ChiefJustice to provide a more comprehensive and candid explanation. Section 3501 would have essentially restored the pre-Mirandacasespecific-voluntariness-!test, which the Court had determined generated
an "unacceptably great"'68' volume of false-negatives and therefore
required some doctrinal supplementation.
III. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS

Let me now tentatively sketch some more general implications of my
defense ofMirandaandDickerson for the construction ofjudicial doctrine.
A. Deternining What Constitutes a "Fully Effective"Alternative
To begin with, the defense of MirandaI have sketched here has some
implications for the Supreme Court's continuing invitation, in both
Miianda and Dickerson, for Congress and the states to devise equally
effective alternatives to the Mirandaframework.69
First, this approach informs what it would mean for a proposed
alternative to be "fully as effective." While commentators have not been
entirely clear about this point, they generally appear to assume that the
alternative would have to achieve the same low false-negative rate as
does the Miranda framework. 7' But I'm not sure that's correct. The
Mathews v. Eldridge model I borrowed above suggests that the Supreme
Court should be trying to strike an optimal balance; it should establish
a doctrinal framework that will reduce false-negatives to a tolerable
level, while still taking into account competing government interests. At
some point, the marginal reduction in undetected violations is too costly.
Suppose, hypothetically, that Congress enacts the 2001 Videotape
Act, according to which federal officials must videotape all custodial

65. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).

66. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
67. Seearso Strauss, supra
note 42, at 966-69 (advancing similar defense of Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.

298 (1985)).
68. Dickerso, 530 U.S. at 442.
69. &esupra note I I and accompanying text.
70. See,e.g.,Landsberg, supra note 2, at 974 (saying that Congress and the states may replace the
Miranda rule "with any procedure that effectively protects the core right of silence").
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interrogations from beginning to end, and a confession is admissible into
evidence only if the court, based on viewing the video, determines that
the confession was not coerced. Such a measure would reduce falsenegatives as compared to the old case-specific-voluntariness-test without
any videotaped record, though in a different way than do the Miranda
warnings. The Miranda warnings dispel the inherently coercive
environment of custodial interrogation, making it less likely that any
ensuing confession is the product of coercion. In contrast, the
Videotape Act would not actually dispel the coercive force of the
interrogation; rather, it would preserve an objective factual record and
thereby improve a court's capacity to apply the case-specificvoluntariness-test,. and it would presumably reduce false-negatives by
giving the court more accurate data upon which to base a determination
of coercion.
Suppose the Supreme Court evaluates the Videotape Act and decides
that it will produce significantly fewer false-negatives than did the casespecific-voluntariness-test by itself, but still a few more false-negatives
than does Miranda. Put numerically, suppose the conventional casespecific-voluntariness-test generates a false-negative rate of 2 0%
(meaning two out of every ten confissions the test designates as freely
given, and hence admissible, are truly coerced and hence admission is
actually unconstitutional); suppose the Mirandaframework generates a
false-negative rate of 1%; and suppose the Videotape Act would
generate a false-negative rate of 3%.7" But on the other hand, the
Videotape Act compromises competing governmental interests far less
than does Miranda, because it doesn't screen out as many freely-given
confessions. In other words, suppose the Mirandaframework generates
a false-positive rate of 20% (meaning two out of every ten confessions
suppressed as non-Miranda-compliant are freely given), and the
Videotape Act generates a false-positive rate of 3 %. On the whole,
compared to Miranda the Act is not as quite as good at reducing falsenegatives (3%to 1%), but it creates fewer unfortunate false-positives (3 %
to 20%). How should the Supreme Court respond?
Rather than focus exclusively on the comparative false-negative
bottom line, the Mathews approach suggests that the Court should ask
whether the overall balance of competing interests struck by the
Videotape Act, securing lesser constitutional protection but at less social
cost, is a better overall balance than that struck by the Miranda
framework. In other words, just as the Court might compare two
procedural schemes for protecting welfare benefits from wrongful

71.

These numbers, of course, are entirely made up for purposes of illustration.
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termination and prefer one scheme which has a slightly higher error rate
but costs substantially less to implement, the Court might prefer the
Videotape Act to the Mirandaframework despite the slightly higher rate
of false-negatives the Act produces. The Mathews-modeled approach to
determining the propriety of doctrinal protection, therefore, allows for
the possibility that a congressional (or state) alternative might be
considered "fully as effective" even if it doesn't protect the Fifth
Amendment right to precisely the same extent as does Miranda. As a
result, the Court's invitation to consider equivalent alternatives may be
more capacious and allow for more flexibility than has been previously
realized.
B. Judicial-LegislativeInteraction
The analysis I employ in this essay brings to light a second point
regarding the Supreme Court's invitation to create equally effective
alternatives: it informs the conceptual mechanics by which a
congressional or state alternative could displace Miranda. Contrary to
some previous claims, the Mirandarule is not some form ofjudge-made
federal common law, subject like all common law to being overridden
by statute.72 Rather, the rule - like all doctrinal rules developed by
courts to implement constitutional rights - reflects the straightforward
exercise of the judicial power to interpret and apply the Constitution in
discrete cases and controversies. Congress can no more "override"
doctrinal rules than it can "override" the Court's interpretation of the
underlying constitutional rights being implemented.7"
What Congress can do, however, is use its conventional legislative
powers" to enact a statute providing equally effective protection for the
Fifth Amendment, which then becomes binding on federal courts in
addition to the Court's previously announced doctrinal protections.

72. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note I; Grano, supra note 47, at 156; cf.HaroldJ. Krent, How toMove
Byondthe Fcuionp Rule: StructhingjudicialReuponseto LegislaiveReform Efforts, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 855, 857-61
(1999) (applying argument to Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).
73. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437 ("Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting
and applying the Constitution.").
74. Congress could regulate federal law enforcement interrogations and the judicial admissibility
thereof pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.18. Congress could, to
some degree at least, regulate state law enforcement interrogations and the judicial admissibility thereof
pursuant to the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see
Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared ConstitidionalInterpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 61, 85-103
(discussing Congress's Article I and Section 5 power to provide effective Mirandaalternatives for both federal
and state actors); see alro Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriatle"Means-EndsConstraints
on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 1127 (2001) (arguing that the Court's recent case law interpreting the scope of Congress's Section
5 power requires an overly stringent level of means-ends tailoring).
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Suppose again that Congress enacts the Videotape Act, and suppose
further the Court deems this to provide an equally effective way of
safeguarding the Fifth Amendment right against compelled testimony.
The Videotape Act by itself doesn't override or displace the Miranda
doctrine; in fact, the two can peacefully co-exist, such that the police
would have to both comply with the Miranda requirements and also
videotape their interrogations in order to avoid suppression.
The assumption, however, is that once the Court assures itself that the
Act qualifies as an equally effective measure, the Court would react to
the Videotape Act by changingthe doctrinalrequirementsofthe Fifh Amendment,
because now the Amendment no longer needs the same level of
protection through judicial doctrine. Perhaps the Court would revert
back to the old case-specific-voluntariness-test. Perhaps instead the
Court would retrench only part-way - for example, holding that given
the Videotape Act, the Fifth Amendment no longer requires police to
inform suspects of their right to silence but still requires them to inform
suspects of their right to appointed counsel. Or perhaps the Court
would retrench even beyond the old case-specific-voluntariness-test and
hold that the Fifth Amendment itself requires suppression only if the
suspect can prove coercion beyond a reasonable doubt.
The central point is that it remains entirely within the Court's control
whether, and how, it wants to recraft Fifth Amendment doctrine in light
75
of an effective substitute. So despite some loose talk along these lines,
there is no sense in which Congress can itself override judicial doctrine,
even with an equally effective measure of its own.
Moreover, this also means that if the Court concludes that the
Videotape Act is not an equally effective alternative to Miranda because
it does not sufficiently reduce the likelihood of false-negatives, the Court
still would not invalidate the Act. It is not unconstitutional for Congress
(or a state) to impose additional (though less effective) controls on
interrogations.76 Rather, the Act would remain valid and enforceable,
but the Supreme Court would not backtrack from Mirandain response.
As a result, custodial interrogators would both have to videotape their
interrogations (to avoid suppression on statutory grounds) and continue

75. See,
e.g., Landsberg, supra note 2, at 974 (teferring to Congress's power "to change judicially
adopted prophylactic rules"); Strauss, supra note 42, at 969 (asking whether "the Miranda warnings can be
replaced by legislation"); Dorf& Friedman, supranote 74, at 85 ("[U]ust as Congress has power after Dickerson
to pass legislation altering Miranda's guidelines, so too do the states.").
76. Of course, contrary to my hypothetical Videotape Act, the Court was correct to conclude that
§ 3501 must "yield to Miranda'smore specific requirements," Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437, since that provision
purported to require federal courts to admit evidence insome circumstances notwithstanding a violation of
Miranda's dictates. See18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000) ("a confession . . .shall beadmissible in evidence if it is
voluntarily given") (emphasis added).
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to comply with Miranda in its entirety. 7 In sum, the consequences of a
failed effort by Congress (or a state) to displace the Miranda framework
are commonly misunderstood.
C. DoctrinalIncorporationof State Interests
In addition to sharpening the ways in which we think about the
Supreme Court's "effective alternatives" invitation, the defense of
Mirandasketched in this essay has broader jurisprudential implications.
First, the defense makes clear that the judicial enforcement of
constitutional rights routinely takes into account some notion of
competing state interests.
We frequently divide the universe of rights into those that are
"absolute" and those that are subject to "balancing" against
countervailing government interests. When a court identifies a prima
facie violation of a "balancing" right, the court then asks whether the
government conduct serves a sufficiently compelling interest so as to
justify the infringement.7 ' But when a court identifies a violation of an
"absolute" right, that's the end of the inquiry: the government conduct
is unconstitutional, period. At least thus far, the Supreme Court has
treated the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination
as an "absolute" right; the government cannot justify its violation for
any reason.79
But competing government interests are not entirely absent from the
equation; they are just lurking beneath the surface by helping to shape
the right's doctrinal protection. As I noted earlier, one could deal with
the problem of identifying actual constitutional violations in this
inherently uncertain world by trying to screen out 100% of coerced
77.

This suggests that if Congress (or a state) implements an alternative that is deemed insufficient

by the Court, Congress might want to be ready quickly to repeal its own measure, so as not to impose even
greater burdens on the police than before. If Congress simultaneously requires courts to admit non-Mirandacompliant confessions (as in § 3501)and embraces an alternative deemed inadequate by the Court, Congress
could avoid any need for a subsequent repeal of the alternative by including a nonseverability clause in the
original legislation: when the purported Miranda override is invalidated, the alternative will become
inoperative as well.
78. See,e.g.,Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) ("Federal racial
classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly
tailored to further that interest.").
79. Criminal procedure classrooms often debate the hypothetical involving a suspected terrorist who
refuses to reveal in which elementary school a bomb isabout toexplode: may the police coerce her into
confessing? This hypothethical doesn't really push the question whether the Self-Incrimination Clause is
absolute, as the government can always coerce the confession and just refrain from using the confession
against her in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Of course, if the government coercion rises to the level
of a substantive due process violation, e.g.,constitutes torture, then the question is squarely posed whether
the due process right isabsolute in this context.
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confessions. All this approach would require is a doctrinal rule
precluding the government from ever using at trial the product of a
custodial interrogation under any circumstances. While such an
extreme measure would perfectly protect the Fifth Amendment right,
however, it would also severely undermine competing government
interests. We don't aim for a 100% screen, here or elsewhere, precisely
because the costs are too high. Instead, we aim for a constitutionally
tolerable level of false-negatives, taking into account the government
interests on the other side. But that means, even for rights we call
"absolute" and refuse to balance away at the back end, there has already
been some calibration of government interests worked into the front-end
definition of doctrinal protection. So one way or the other, our
commitment to rights is virtually always contextual to some degree.
D. The Illusion of "Prophylactic"Rules
Perhaps most fundamentally, my defense of Mirandaundermines the
entire conceptualization of various doctrinal rules as "prophylactic" in
some special sense. Through this point I have bowed to convention and
employed the term "prophylactic" to refer to doctrinal rules selfconsciously crafted by courts for the instrumental purpose of improving
the detection of and/or otherwise safeguarding against the violation of
constitutional norms. If used in this fashion,8" I now propose that we
jettison the phrase "prophylactic rule" from our vocabulary, because
there really isn't any such thing as a distinctively prophylactic rule that
is in any important way distinguishable from the more run-of-the-mill
doctrine that courts routinely establish and implement regarding every
constitutional norm. To the extent one purports to use the adjective
"prophylactic" as a descriptive term, it confuses more than it clarifies;
and to the extent one purports to use the adjective pejoratively, it
inappropriately raises concerns of legitimacy where none should exist.
The terminology misleadingly suggests that so-called prophylactic
rules differ in kind from so-called "ordinary" doctrinal rules. But if the
argument is that prophylactic rules are different because they rest on
some institutional judgments concerning the capacity of courts to
enforce constitutional norms, rather than merely on some "pure"
interpretation of those norms, this is just wrong - such institutional
judgments are precisely the stuff of which most constitutional law is
made. Almost all constitutional doctrine, from Article I and the First
Amendment on down, represents a judicial judgment both about the

80. But seepra note 2 (discussing an alternative definition).
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content of the constitutional norm worthy of protection and also about a
court's institutional capacity to enforce that norm in various ways,
taking into account both its own propensities and limitations and those
of other relevant actors such as lower federal and state courts.8 '
Consider, for example, the First Amendment, where the Court
navigates through cases wielding doctrines such as the public forum
doctrine82 and the content-neutrality doctrine," both of which reflect
efforts to make the protection of First Amendment values judicially
manageable. Consider the Equal Protection Clause, where the Court
navigates through cases by imposing various tiers of scrutiny as rough
proxies for invidious discrimination."
Consider the scope of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, where the Court
suggests it will now navigate through cases using the regulation of a
commercial activity as a rough proxy for the regulation of interstate
commerce.85 In each of these contexts, the Court employs doctrinal
rules and presumptions that help it screen out unconstitutional conduct
in a manageable way. And these rules and presumptions are all based,
at least in part, on a self-conscious assessment of thejudicial capacity to
enforce the underlying norms in various manners.8" Miranda is simply
not different in kind; its sin, if it be one, is the somewhat greater candor
with which the Court acknowledges the role being played by its own
institutional assessments.
Indeed, if Miranda is labeled "prophylactic," one might fairly ask:
compared to what? The obvious answer is "compared to the casespecific-voluntariness-test."
But that test is "no more 'directly
compelled' by the Constitution, and no more a product of the 'explicit'
text of the Constitution than Mirandaitself."87 The Fifth Amendment
requires the exclusion of compelled statements. Both the case-specificvoluntariness-test and the Miranda framework represent different
doctrinal tools by which courts might screen out actually compelled
statements - in this sense, both are instrumental devices designed to

81. For a compelling defense of this proposition, see Strauss, supra note 1; se.also Strauss, supra note
42; Caminker, supra note 74, at 1170 ("[B]ased on institutional and sometimes empirical considerations,
courts must translate abstract norms or rights into specific and elaborate legal doctrines useful for resolving
concrete cases.").
82. See
supra note 31 and accompanying text.
83. See
supra note 32 and accompanying text.
84. See
Strauss, supra note 1, at 204-05.
85. See
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (suggesting critical doctrinal distinction is
"whether an intrastateactivity is commercial or noncommercial"); idi at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption that we have a single market and a
unified purpose to build a stable national economy.").
86. See
gmera Fallon, supra note 28, at 61-67.
87. Kamisar, supra note 26, at 426.
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safeguard constitutional values. And they each have a different success
rate in doing so. Compared to the case-specific-voluntariness-test,
Miranda likely screens out both more actually coerced confessions and
more actually freely-given confessions; it is a more rigorous screen all
around. But the Constitution certainly does not indicate a preference
for the more porous screen. Indeed, I've argued - and I think Dickerson
squarely held - that the more porous screen is constitutionally
inadequate. Yet even if one disagrees with this bottom-line judgment,
I do not think one can persuasively maintain that the two doctrinal rules
are different in kind rather than degree. There is no analytical reason
to privilege the case-specific-voluntariness-test as being the appropriate
"benchmark" as against
which the Miranda rules can be intelligibly
88
labeled "prophylactic.
Perhaps Miranda seems like a special case because the Court
sometimes uses both the Miranda screen and the case-specificvoluntariness-test to assess the same product of custodial interrogation.
A defendant has two bites at the apple when attempting to suppress a
confession. First, the defendant can argue that his confession was
compelled as determined by the case-specific-voluntariness-test, and
thus cannot be used by the prosecution for any purpose. Second, if this
fails, the defendant can argue that the confession was obtained' in
violation of Miranda,in which case at least the confession can't be used
in the prosecution's case-in-chief (though it can still be used for other
purposes, such as impeachment or investigatory leads). This two-layer
screen might make it feel as though the case-specific-voluntariness-test
is the "real" constitutional test and Miranda plays second fiddle. The
Court has continually fed this imagery by saying (at least pre-Dickerson)
that "Miranda's preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the
defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm."8 9
But this argument relies solely on semantics. Miranda excludes some
confessions even though the case-specific-voluntariness-test would not,
but the case-specific-voluntariness-test and the Constitution are not the
same thing at all; the former isjust one proxy for the latter. One can
just as easily say that the Miranda requirements constitute the "real"
constitutional test and the voluntariness inquiry serves as the
88. Indeed, it is worth recalling that the Court's opinion in Mirandaitself nowhere describes the rule
it announces as "prophylactic" in nature. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 436, 536, 544 (1966) (White,
J., dissenting) (describing case as establishing a "per se"rule). While various Justices soon used the term
"prophylactic" to describe other doctrines, see, e.g.,United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 251 (1967) (White,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (describing requirement that counsel be present at pre-trial
identification line-ups as a "broad prophylactic rule"), the Miranda rule itself was not described by the Court
as "prophylactic" until Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 433, 439 (1974).
89. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985); see
supra notes 13-17.
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supplement.9" The best way to characterize the relation between
Miranda and the case-specific-voluntariness-test is as follows: both are
mutually supportive doctrinal tools by which the Court tries to screen
out actually compelled confessions so as to safeguard the Fifth
Amendment; as such, both deserve equal respect as applied in their
own proper spheres.9 '
To summarize: there is commonly some slippage between rights and
the doctrinal rules that enforce those rights, slippage designed in part to
manage the probabilistic nature of most constitutional violations. This
is true both for doctrinal tests that turn on all relevant case-specific
circumstances and for doctrinal tests that invoke per se presumptions,
which are all over the law.92 Miranda differs from run-of-the-mill and
unquestionably legitimate doctrinal rules only in degree, not in kind.93

90. The fact that the Court deploys the case-specific-voluntariness-test as the only screen in certain
contexts, such as where the prosecutor wants to use a confession solely for impeachment purposes, doesn't
somehow make that test represent some constitutional core in the abstract, such that the addition of the
Mirandascreen in the case-in-chief context demonstrates that Mirandagoes beyond the "core" and istherefore
"prophylactic." It just means the Court has established different rules for defining the proper level of
constitutional protection in different contexts, such as for impeachment and for the case-in-chief - which is
what the ChiefJustice said (albeit inartfully) when he observed that "no constitutional rule is immutable."
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000).
91. Similarly, the common characterization of Miranda and other so-called prophylactic rules as
"overprotecting" the constitutional right in question should come to an end. This pejorative wrongly
assumes some "natural" baseline of lesser protection. Indeed, Dickerson essentially holds that Mirandaprovides
the constitutionally requisite level of protection with respect to admissibility in the prosecution's case-in-chief,
which in contrast means that the case-specific-voluntariness-test unacceptably underprotects the Fifth
Amendment.
92. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 7, at 448-49; Klein, supra note 2, at 1037-51.
93. One could, of course, define "prophylactic" in a different sense than I use the term here, such
that there is a conceptual distinction between prophylactic rules thus defined and run-of-the-mill judiciallycrafted doctrines. In his ardent attack on both Miranda and the concept of prophylactic rules, for example,
Professor Grano concedes that the phrase "prophylactic" as I have defined it here "has the potential for wide
employment in constitutional discourse" and its usage in this manner "raise [s] no issues of particular interest
.....

" JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 175 (1993).

But Professor Grano, in

contrast, ascribes to the term prophylactic "a special and narrower meaning." Id. He instead employs the
term "prophylactic" to refer to rules that supplement the enforcement of constitutional rights but do not
themselves function to help define a violation ofthose rights. Id. ("[A]s used by the Tucker plurality to describe
Miranda, prophylactic rules are not simply protective devices for constitutional provisions but more
importantly - and this isthe crux of the matter for the legitimacy issue - rules that may be violated without
violating the Constitution."); id. at 190 ("One must take care not to confuse a per se rule that does not
require case-by-case factual analysis with a rule that can be violated without violating the Constitution.");
id. at 191 ("It bears repeating that a rule is prophylactic, as that term isused in Miranda, [but see supra note
2] not because it, or its underlying constitutional provision, instrumentally serves other ends. A rule is
prophylactic only when the rule may be violated without violating the Constitution."). Thus narrowly
defined, prophylactic rules "are not nearly so pervasive as some commentators contend." Id. at 190. Indeed,
Professor Grano himself identifies only Miranda and its progeny, Pearce (see supra notes 48-52 and
accompanying text), and a rule governing eyewitness identification testimony that was proposed by Justice
Marshall in dissent but rected by the Court in Manson v.Braitaue, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). Grano, supra note
4 7 , at I I1- 1!5; compare id. at 115-123 (listing rules commonly but "improperly" categorized as prophylactic).
Justice Scalia also appears to have this very narrow definition in mind when he claims in his
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IV. CONCLUSION

The persistent challenge to prophylactic rules basically ignores the
significance of our living in an uncertain world. We can say, and
perhaps must continue to say for ease of simple communication, that
government conduct is unconstitutional if it fails to pass muster under
a judicially established doctrinal test, and it is constitutional if it passes
muster. But in reality, that privileges the test too much. Perhaps courts
can determine, with relative certitude, whether a presidential candidate
is thirty-five years old or whether a trial started within a certain number
of days after indictment. But many constitutionally salient facts are
more messy, and many questions require inherently normative
judgment calls as well. We often cannot know with certainty whether
a violation has occurred or not - all courts can do is construct
appropriate screens, and their propriety ought to turn, in substantial
part, on whether they do a good job in screening out probable
violations. In such a world of uncertainty, so-called prophylactic rules
like Miranda are surely understandable and indeed inevitable.

Dickerson dissent that only Miranda (and some of its progeny) and Pearce are properly characterized as true
prophylactic rules. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 457-60 (Scalia,J., dissenting). He distinguishes these examples from
other cases cited by the petitioner "in which the Court quite simply exercised its traditional judicial power
to define the scope of constitutional protections and, relatedly, the circumstances in which they are violated."
ld at 457.
Thus narrowly defined, the phrase "prophylactic rule" becomes inapplicable to the vast array
of instrumentally crafted doctrinal rules referred to above, such as those implementing the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, see supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text, since those rules do indeed help
define what counts as a violation of an underlying constitutional norm. As such, I would concede that the
phrase does draw an important conceptual distinction.
However, thus narrowly understood the phrase still has little ifanypracticalusefulness. Professor
Grano concedes that "[o]nly the Court, not its critics, can determine whether its decisions are merely
prophylactic" as he defines the term. GRANO, supra, at 178. And when the Court in Dicke'son held that
Miranda is a constitutionally based rule, see sipra note 18 and accompanying text, the Court essentially
rejected the characterization of Mirandaas prophylactic under Professor Grano's (andJustice Scalia's) narrow
terminology. I do not mean to suggest in the text that we ought tojettison the term "prophylactic" from our
constitutional lexicon ifwe carefully define it as narrowly as does Professor Grano. But so defined, the term
no longer properly encompasses Miranda (notwithstanding the years of complaint to the contrary, see supra
notes 35-47 and accompanying text), and has few - if any - referents elsewhere in constitutional doctrine.
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